Nathan Seamons v. Larry D. Anderson et al : Brief of Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant Seamons by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1951
Nathan Seamons v. Larry D. Anderson et al : Brief
of Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant Seamons
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
L. Delos Daines; Newel G. Daines; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Seamons v. Andersen, No. 7691 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1515
7691 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATHAN SEAMONS, as the surviving 
partner of SEAl\lONS & LOVELAND, 
Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
LARRY D. ANDERSON and HANS P. 
ANDERSON, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
and RICHARD PETERSEN, 
Defendant, Counter-Claimant, 
Ct·oss-Claimant, Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
and CLAYTON E. NIELSEN and RAY 
BITTERS, Co-Partners, doing business 
in the firm name and style of VALLEY 
CAR MARKET, 
Defendants and Cross-Appellants 
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y -~ words;- ni l;ooo -miiea-.-n, p~ease add ,, -(T.R~~"2.S)) H~ -- -------- -·-----·- ~ . ··--
/ 4. On page 7, last line., atter words, "title ·:rrom Petersen.", please 
v add "(T.R. 128-9) (T.R. 14.3-5) 1*. 
/ S. on page 8 atter paragraph 11 after the words, "conclusion of law 
taUs.", please insert ••(T.R. 2, 15, I6, 341 91, 143-145)". 
/ 6. On page 8 at.t$r second complete paragraph, attar words, "Petersen's 
agent. "• please inaert •(T.R. 1.28, 129, 131)"• 
/ 7. On page 9 at the end or the first complete paragraph after words, "the defendants Andersona,u, plea·•• inaer\ "('l'·R· 2, 15 and 16)". 
8. On page 10 at· the end of the first paragraph after the word, "case.", 
/please insert u(f.R. 249, 250, 274, 275)"• 
9. On page ll at the end of the first paragraph following the word, 
./ "A.nd·ersons.'*·, please insert tt(T.R. 62, 19, 80, 87, 114) ''. 
10. on page 11 at the end of the second complete paragraph after the 
word, "contract.", please inaert n(T •. R. 166, 167)"• 
v&r-t truly yours, 
L.DD:CJC 1. ·nelos llainea 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
NATHAN SEAMONS, as the surviving 
partner of SEAMONS & LOVELAND, 
Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
LARRY D. ANDERSON and HANS P. 
ANDERSON, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
and RICHARD PETERSEN, 
BRIEF OF 
PLAINTIFF 
AND CROSS-
APPELLANT 
SEAMONS 
Defendant, Counter-Claimant, 
Cross-Claimant, Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
CASE NO. 7691 
and CLAYTON E. NIELSEN and RAY 
BITTERS, Co-Partners, doing business 
in the firm name and style of VALLEY 
CAR MARKET, 
Defendants and Cross-Appellants 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND CROSS-APPELLANT· 
SEAMONS 
STATE:\IENT OF FACTS 
To avoid repetition, plaintiff and. cross-appellant 
Nea1nons (hereinafter designated "plaintiff") substan- , 
tinily adopts and makes his own the statement of facts 
eontained in the brief of cross-appellants Clayton E .. 
Nielsen and Ray Bitters as set forth in pages 2 to .6 in-
C'lHNivP of their hrief, except plaintiff asserts that the 
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·]nstrurnent Pxecuted by defendants Andersons and plain-
tiff \Vhich was in forn1 a conditional sales contract (plain-
tiff's Exhibit 1) was, in effect, a chattel mortgage. 
Plaintiff after demand and refusal of payn1ent rnade 
upon the Andersons under the above instrun1ent, pos-
~essed t~e car, at which ti~e the titlr.f.l~r1l3 \vas put 
1n plant1ff's hands by the -\alley ~larket=1 Shortly there-
after defendant Petersen \vrongfully took the title from 
plaintiff's desk in plaintiff's office in Logan \Vithout 
plaintiff's kno\vledge or consent (T.R. 252-253) and 
thereafter refused to return said title to plaintiff, al-
though repeated efforts were n1ade to get Petersen to do 
so. ( :r. ~ J 7/J/ ~.2.-J ) 
l ... pon the Andersons' failure to rnake payments (T. 
R. 198), plaintiff was legally obligated to pay and did pay 
to Comrnercial Credit Cornpany $1517.00. (T.R. 127) 
Plaintiff asserts that he had no kno\vledge of an~· 
agreernent \vhereby Petersen \vas to deliver title to the 
~ll:}rcury conditionally. 
PoiN-t 1. That the trial court erred 1n conclusion 
of lawt(~. 10~ et seq.) by holding, in effect, that plaintiff 
by retention of the I\Iercury after repossession and hy 
operating the I\1ercury approxirnately 7,000 rniles had 
\vaived his right to· a personal judgrnent against any 
party. 
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~\RGf'"~IENT- POINT I . 
.. A.gainst this conclusion of law plaintiff argues: 
(a) That the conclusion that plaintiff waived his 
right to a personal judg1nent against any of the parties 
i~ contrary to the la'v and evidence. 
The instrun1ent upon which plaintiff sued ·(Plain~ 
tiff's Exhibit 1) 'Yas, in effect, a chattel mortgage ex-
ecuted by defendants Andersons to plaintiff. The in-
strtmlen t could not be a conditional sales con tract be-
cause plaintiff had no title· to reserve at the time instru-
lnent 'vas executed 'vhich reserved title IS essential to 
a conditional sales contract. 
"\Vhere the purpose and effect of a transaction is to 
create a lien on specific personalty as security for the 
paJinent of a debt, there is a "mortgage" irrespective 
of the language used. Teeter v. Good Hope Corp., 93 P. 
:2rl 11 ~' 14 Cal. 2d 196. 
The elements of a chattel mortgage are present in 
the facts of this case. The intent of defendants Ander-
sons to give plain tiff a lien is evidenced by the terms 
of the instrument giving plaintiff right to repossess the 
!1rreury upon default, power to sell, etc. Plaintiff con-
tends (Point II) that title passed to the Andersons under 
the executed sales agreen1ent between Valley Market 
and the Andersons (defendant Petersen's Exhibit 1). If 
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title passed to Andersons, clearly, as owners, they had a 
n1ortgageable interest. 
Even a buyer under a conditional sales contract 
1nay mortgage the property 'vhich he has purchased 
but not paid for. 14 CJS 617. 
Under UCA 13-0-6 a Inortgagee may foreclose his 
mortgage upon chattels by an action in equity, or may 
advertise ·and sell the n1ortgaged property at public 
auction 'vhere power to sell is given in mortgage. In this 
case the plaintiff sought to foreclose. He was forced 
to so elect due to the conversion of title by Petersen. 
The instrun1ent executed by defendants Andersons to 
plain'tiff provided for a deficiency judgment in case the 
sale of the l\[ercury did not bring sufficient to satisfy 
the judgment. Thus plaintiff contends 'he has a right 
to a personal judg1nent against defendants Andersons 
for this deficiency and/ or a personal judgnlent against 
Richard Petersen for conversion of title, (Point Ic) 
which conversion n1ade a resale i1npossible to the danl-
age of the plaintiff and which prevented plaintiff fron1 
1nini1nizing damages by selling the car. Plaintiff \VH~ 
legally obligated to pay and did pay to Connnercial 
Credit Co1npany $1,517.00 due to the Andersons' default. 
The ·.deficiency bet~veen this an1ount and the $950.00 
brought ~or the Mercury under court sale is $567.00 for 
which the . plaintiff contends he should . have judgn1ent 
against the Andersons. 
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J[ortgagee is entitled to retain a sun1 sufficient to 
repay all expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred 
by hi1n in foreclosing the n1ortgage, even though not 
stipulated in the mortgage. 14 CJS 1087. Therefore, 
plaintiff should be allo,ved his costs. 
~lortgagee n1ay also have attorney's fee where mort-
gage tern1s provided for san1e and where the ·fee is 
reasonable. 14 CJS 1088. The instrument in suit pro-
vided for attorney's fee and evidence was given at the 
trial that $200.00 was a reasonable fee for foreclosure of 
a chattel mortgage. 
(b) That the holding plaintiff oper~ted car ap-
proxinlately 7,000 miles is unsupported by th~ evidence. 
The evidence of Petersen was that the car had been · 
operated approxin1ately 9,000 miles 'vhen he turned it 
over to the \Talley l\Iarket for sale. The evidence of both 
Petersen and Larry Anderson 'vas that they observed 
the speedometer shortly after the time plaintiff pos-
sessed the }[ercury anil~at th~ speedometer read ap-t. '3": . .::LK.J) 
proxi1nately 17,000 miles~ he ev1dence indicates that the 
rar 'vas in the physical possession of the Andersons and 
the valley l\1arket c·ompany for practically the entire 
period between the times these readings were made and 
consequently the n1ileage must be chargeable to the par-
ties in possession during that period. The plaintiff's 
testin1ony was that he ran the car approxi~ately 600 
to 800 1niles in attempting to resell it and inattemnting 
c :r.~ 1.2-j>-9) t. ... ~ 1'1:...1- s J 
to rerov0r th~ title from PeterRen. Thus, the conclusion 
..-'\ 
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iR not supported hy the evidence and the 'vaiver found 
against the plaintiff under this conclusion of law fails. 
l 3': ~ :L. 1 .' ~ 1 ~J1 ~ t q 11 I '19 - Ill .6) 
(e) That retention of the Mercury bet\veen times of 
repossession and the ti1ne of filing suit was excused by 
Petersen's conversion of title making a sale impossible 
to the plain tiff's dan1age. 
After default of Andersons and demand and re-
fusal 1uade upon the1n, plain tiff possessed the car under 
the ter1ns of the chattel n1ortgage. Title was delivered 
to plaintiff by \Talley ~Iarket, Petersen's agent. l J. r, J~f) 
I~ ,,1~1). 
· A 1nortgagee entitled to possession of personal prop-
erty covered by his mortgage may ·Inaintain an action 
against the third party 'vho has converted sa1ne without 
first obtaining a judgment against the mortgagor and 
'vithout making hi1n a party to the suit. Ho'ward v. First 
National Bank of I-Intchison, 44 l{an. 549, 24 Pac. 983. 
·A 1uortgagee has such interest after breach of con-
dition as to entitle hin1 to 1naintain trover for a conver-
sion of the chattels n1ortgaged. First N a tiona! Bank 
r. Sin1an, G5 S. DalL 514, 275 N.vV. 347. 
The cases indicate a 1nortgagee has a sufficient 
interes.t. in the n1ortgaged property to sue a converter. 
Petersen's taking of title 'vas unlawful in that title had 
passed to Andersons and the plaintiff as 1nortgagee had, 
through Andersons' default, succeeded to Anderson~' 
interest in tltP property. This conversion 1nade a sale 
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of the ~Iercury by plaintiff 'vithout physical evidence· 
of title impossible. Plaintiff 'va.s drunaged in that at 
the ti1ne of possession, August 15, 1949, the car was 
'vorth, according to the advisory verdict of the jury 'vhich 
the court adopted $1700.00. The car brought $950.00 when 
sold under court order. This amount of depreciation 
'vas caused by the conversion of title 'vhich prevented 
a sale by the plaintiff over a period during which the 
value of the ~[ercury diminished. 
The plaintiff is not only entitled to deficiency judg-
ment against the defendants Andersons as aforesaid 
but is entitled to a judgment against the defendant Peter-
sen in the sun1 of $750.00 for the conversion, conditioned 
upon the plaintiff's being unable to collect the deficiency 
judgn1ent against the defendants Andersons. { J. ~ .2,~ /5 '1- I~ 
POINT II 
That the trial court erred in finding of fact 3 ( R. 
108 et. seq.) in finding, in effect, that Richard Petersen 
"is now" and was the owner of the Mercury and en-
titled to possession or payinent. 
ARGUMENT 
Attention is called to the executed contract as dis-
cussed in statement of facts in the brief of defendants 
Nielsen and Bitters. The contract tern1s were set forth 
in defendant Petersen's Exhibit 1 and no mention is. 
n1ade therein of any reserved title in Petersen. Peter-
Hen's authorized agent to sell, 'Talley Market, made the 
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contract and Petersen assented to its tern1s. Strictly, 
the ter1ns of statute UCA 57 -3a-72 were not corn plied 
\vith in that no registration and title were issued 
by the Motor Vehicle Departn1ent to Andersons. 
1-Iovvever, there is evidence to the effect that Petersen 
signed the title before a notary, ~fr. Bitters, who 'vas 
Petersen's agent to sell, and that said agent neglected 
to notarize the title. Petersen hi1nself testified that he 
turned the title over to \'"alley l\farket for the purpose· 
of registration and licensl.ng in favor of Andersons which 
vvould involve issuance of a new title. 'l.,he proceedings 
had so far progressed towards placing the title in An-
der~ons that on the basis of an executed contract An-
dersons at any tin1e before their failure to pay could havr 
legally forced Pet~rsen to transfer title so that regis-
tration and a new title would have issued to Anderson~. 
By n1ajority opinion in Jackson v. Ja1nes, 97 Utah 41, the 
TT tah Supreu1e. Court held that a completed gift of a 
vehicle 'vas operative to transfer title to a ear despite the 
'vords of TiC A. 57 -3a-72. The holding vva.s that con1pliancr 
'vith the statute vvas not 1nandatory to pass title in that 
ease .. ( J. ~ ~ '19/ .2.5tJ" '-711, J.-75) 
In the present case vvhere the contract 'vas executed 
and only the forrnality of proper notarization remained, 
together 'vith the forn1ality of issuance of new title nncl 
registration hy the ~1otor \Tehicle Department, a fair con-
sideration of the facts should place the title in the An-
dersons. Petersen and the \ 7alley ~rarket kne'v of the 
arrange1nent to finanee thP ~fercury through plaintiff 
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and neeepted $1400.00 on the purchase price 'vhich 
... \ndersons procured under this arrange1nent. Petersen's 
agent 'vas instrun1ental in securing this financing and 
it "ras kno,vn to then1 that the chattel 1nortgage executed 
to secure the obligation 'vas obtained by giving plain-
tiff a lien upon the ca.r as security. The plain tiff con-
tends that this knowledge, actual or imputed, estops 
Petersen from asserting that title did not pass to the 
.A.ndersons. (_ J.,. ~ tJ./ )~ tf4/ r~ 1/¥) 
POINT III 
That the court erred in fin.d~ng of fact 5 (R. 108 et. 
seq.) in holding, in effect, that plaintiff kne'v of an agree-
nlent between Petersen and Valley Market. whereby 
Petersen was to retain title until paid. 
ARGUMENT 
There is no evidence in the record to support the 
finding that plaintiff knew of such an ag-reement. The 
evidence of plaintiff Sea1nons was that Loveland (Sea-
Inons' deceased partner who was alive at the time the 
instrument in suit, plaintiff's Exhibit 1, was executed) 
agreed to finance the car. The plaintiff believes that 
the trial court 1nisconstrued the testimony of Seamons in 
finding that he knew of an agreement for conditional 
delivery of title by Petersen. Seamons testified that he 
knew of conditions in the chattel mortgage which was in 
for1n a conditional sales contrart. l J. f. /~~It, 7) 
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V'l I IEl~EF·ORE, plaintiff respectfully suh1nits that 
the trial court erred in failing to enter a deficiency judg-
Inent against defendants Andersons in the a1nount of 
$567.00, costs, attorney's fee in the an1ount of $200.00 
and/ or erred in failing to enter a judginent against 
defendant Petersen for conversion of title to the plain-
tiff's da1nage in the amount of $750.00. 
L. DELOS DAINES, 
Continental Bank Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
NEWEL G. DAINES, 
Cache Valley Bank Building, 
Logan, Utah 
Attorneys for PLaintiff and 
Cross-Appell-ant, Seamons 
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